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LESSONS FROM THE ENEMY: HMO TO ACO
Matthew Smith*
I hate admitting that my enemies have a point.1
Introduction
Among the many pieces of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA),2 accountable care organizations (ACOs)3 are among
Congress’s few seductions. Organizations who choose to participate
in the program are promised new payments in exchange for changed
incentives. While only the payment structures of those tempted orga-
nizations are directly impacted, Congress’s hopes for cascading ef-
fects make ACOs’ scope ambitious.4 Congress aims to control health-
care costs while maintaining (or improving) quality and access;5 as
some commenters have skewered: “have [their] cake and eat it too.”6
Its starting point was unenviable. A century of undirected evolution
left the country with a labyrinth of healthcare delivery systems.7 The
payment structures that developed to accommodate, and influence,
these various systems can seem similarly convoluted. However, ef-
forts to tame these unwieldy structures are not new, nor is the realiza-
tion that quality and access concerns are entwined with payment re-
form.8 With this history of success and failure to build on, ACOs
incorporate some lessons of past reforms.
* University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. expected May 2014;
Thunderbird School of Global Management, M.B.A. 2008; Davidson College, B.A.
2003. I would like to thank my father for his support and unique insights into the
ACO transition and Professor Huberfeld for her help in guiding this project to
fruition.
1. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES 118 (Random House Trade
Paperback ed., Random House 2008) (1988).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528 (Apr. 7, 2011).
4. Id. at 19,530-4 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (final rule published 76 Fed. Reg.
67801 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425.102).
5. Id. at 19,531.
6. Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake
and Eat It Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2012).
7. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982).
8. For a dated, but thorough, discussion of some of the earliest reforms
through the late 1970s, see Id. at 235-419; For a more recent study of current
187
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But not all. ACOs attempt to meld the effective and popular as-
pects of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) into the varied
delivery systems across the country.9 Proponents are quick to high-
light how ACOs are not a reincarnation of HMOs.10 After all, HMOs
have a bad name.11 Consequently, ACOs attempt this melding with-
out the most maligned aspects of HMOs: the rationing of care and
lack of patient choice.12 Unfortunately, these were some of the very
aspects that drove HMOs’ success in controlling costs.13 Instead,
ACOs focus on changing individual physician practice patterns.14
This paper argues this focus is too narrow. Some aspects of financial
accountability that drove HMOs’ successes, and were the conceptual
basis for ACOs,15 have been neglected in the transition from concept
to policy. In this respect, at least, it is not that ACOs are too much
like HMOs, but that they are too little.
In focusing exclusively on physician practice patterns, the sys-
temic balance16 bolstering HMOs’ success in controlling costs is ig-
nored. For ACOs that already have inherent accountability for sys-
temic capacity, those most closely resembling old-style HMOs to
begin with, correcting this neglect is not critical to their success.
However, while financial accountability for individual physicians
should remain the focus of ACOs, the successful elements of sys-
temic accountability can be introduced to bolster not only success
within ACOs, but outside them in the broader healthcare market. In
payment reforms, see Eric Schneider et al., Payment Reform, RAND HEALTH
(2011), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND
_TR841.pdf.
9. Michael Birnbaum, A Conversation with Donald Berwick on Implementing
National Health Reform, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 709, 723 (2012).
10. Id.
11. E.g. Thomas William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health
Care: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 123 (1996).
12. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 723.
13. E.g. Melinda Caliendo, In Considering New Care Model, Stigmatism of
HMO at Forefront, NJBIZ (Oct. 29, 2012)., http://www.njbiz.com/article/
20121029/NJBIZ01/121029877/-1/this_weeks_issue/&template=printart.
14. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 722.
15. Elliot S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26(1) HEALTH AFF. w44, w44 (2007), available
at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.html.
16. Systemic balance, or systemic capacity, is used in this paper to refer to the
efficient supply of healthcare resources available in a healthcare community. These
resources include both personnel, including physicians, and healthcare facilities.
See infra Part II.A.
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their effort to avoid HMO comparisons, ACOs are missing a critical
aspect of cost control.
Part I defines ACOs and their relationship to HMOs, and ex-
plains why they may have a chance for a larger and more lasting
impact. The relationship between ACOs and HMOs is important not
only as predecessor and successor, but because analogies to HMOs
both help define ACOs and tell a cautionary tale for their future. Part
II furthers that comparison by identifying some beneficial character-
istics of HMOs that are absent from ACOs. As this paper focuses in
particular on HMOs’ inherent ability to balance capacity, the cost
implications of capacity imbalance in the healthcare system are dis-
cussed. Part III discusses the focus and purpose of the regulations that
created ACOs and how those regulations may indirectly affect capac-
ity balance. This section also discusses ACOs’ positioning to make
capacity decisions and ways in which those decisions might be
encouraged.
I. The Idea: From HMO to ACO
The traditional fee-for-service payment model, in which pay-
ment is based on the volume and intensity of services delivered, in-
centivizes the provision of more services.17 More services cost more.
ACOs are not the first reform to co-opt this syllogism. Since the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 197318 removed barriers to
managed care,19 managed care has sought to limit unnecessary vol-
ume and intensity through gatekeeping, capitation payments, and
cost-saving incentives.20 It worked. As costs have continued to rise,
so too has the prevalence of managed care.21 HMOs, where patients
pay a fixed fee in exchange for highly-controlled healthcare, are the
pinnacle of this move towards micromanaging the basic incentive
structure of healthcare.22
17. Stanley S. Wallack & Christopher P. Tompkins, Realigning Incentives In
Fee-For-Service Medicare 22(4) HEALTH AFF. 59, 61-2 (2003).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1973).
19. Edward Richards, The Rise of MCOs, Public Health Law Map, LSU Law
Ctr., http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheRiseofMCOs.html. Last updated April 19,
2009.
20. See Christopher B. Forrest, Primary Care Gatekeeping Referrals:
Effective Filter or Failed Experiment?, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 692 (Mar. 29, 2003).
21. David Mechanic, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care, 45 J. HEALTH &
SOC. BEHAV. 76, 77 (2004).
22. Id.
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A. An Inverse Definition
HMOs were not universally, or even mostly, well-received. Phy-
sicians resented their lost autonomy and income potential, while pa-
tients feared quality of care was sacrificed to cost.23 The legislative
responses to these concerns included patient bills of rights and in-
creased regulatory oversight.24 However, these responses both limited
the growth of health maintenance organizations and diluted their ef-
fectiveness.25 The HMO experience—wildly unpopular, if somewhat
effective, cost control—influenced ACO policy formation. ACOs
were designed to exclude some of HMOs least popular features,
while retaining their cost-saving benefits.26 Most specifically, ACOs
do not force patients to use particular providers.27 While ACOs are
loosely defined, proponents are near-universal in defining what they
are not: HMOs. Donald Berwick, former CMS administrator, empha-
sized ACOs “pull[ ] one of the two fangs out of managed care: loss of
choice.”28 ACOs do this by eliminating HMOs most unpopular
hallmarks: gate-keeping, closed networks, and capitation.29 Defining
ACOs as an inverse, of course, is neither precise nor necessarily
accurate.
Yet ACOs elude simple definition. As ACOs began trending in
2010 and 2011, health conference attendees’ favorite joke compared
them to unicorns—everyone had heard of them, but no one had ever
seen one.30 They are a concept defined by the policy implementing
them. Healthcare.gov, a consumer-focused government information
site, defines ACOs as “a group of health care providers who give
coordinated care, chronic disease management, and thereby improve
23. Hal Teitelbaum, Chief Exec. Officer, Crystal Run Healthcare,
Presentation at Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Implementing the Affordable
Care Act: What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011); Robert
J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, 17(4) HEALTH AFF.
80 (1998).
24. Blendon, supra note 23.
25. See generally, Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory
Autopsy, 30(3) J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 427 (2005).
26. Barbara J. Zabawa et al., Adopting Accountable Care Through the
Medicare Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471, 1485-92 (2012).
27. Id. at 1497-8.
28. Birnbaum, supra note 9 at 723.
29. Id. 
30. Sherri Sellmeyer, ACOs: Cloven Hooves and a Horn? HEALTHCARE
REFORM BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://hl-isy.com/Healthcare-Reform-
Blog/March-2011/ACOs.
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the quality of care patients get.”31 Almost as an afterthought, and em-
phasizing the quality component over the cost component, the site
mentions ACOs’ defining feature: “the organization’s payment is tied
to achieving health care quality goals and outcomes that result in cost
savings.”32 The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS)
regulations are more explicitly circular. “Accountable care organiza-
tion (ACO) means a legal entity that is. . . formed by one or more
ACO participants. . ..” “ACO participant means an individual or
group of ACO provider(s). . .that . . .comprise(s) an ACO. . ..”33
While not particularly helpful, these definitions illustrate the diffi-
culty in succinctly defining an organization whose quintessential
characteristic is its payment structure. That payment structure, in
turn, is defined in terms of the goals its proponents hope to achieve.
Those goals, which CMS poetically coins the “three-part aim,” are
“(1) Better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and
(3) lower growth in expenditures.”34 Despite any circularity, it is this
payment structure and the goals it is hoped to achieve that define
ACOs. Unfortunately, ambitious payment structures accommodate
neither easily marketable description nor easy regulatory definition.
The payment structure ACOs are designed to accommodate
builds philosophically on previous programs. During the 1990s, CMS
first demonstrated through a group of experimental projects that fi-
nancial incentives could induce providers to deliver more cost-effi-
cient care.35 These projects, unlike ACOs, were more limited in their
cost-saving mechanisms. CMS shared savings from providers’ use of
cheaper alternatives to expensive supplies and medications with hos-
pitals.36 Hospitals then shared some of these financial benefits with
providers.37 While the program was successful in limiting cost
31. Accountable Care Organization, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/
accountable-care-organization/
32. Id.
33. Definitions, 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2013).
34. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,804 (2011); Donald Berwick, CMS
administrator at the time of the ACO regulations adoption, originally termed this
“the triple aim.” Donald M. Berwick et al., THE TRIPLE AIM: CARE, HEALTH, AND
COST, 27(3) HEALTH AFF. 759 (2008).
35. R. Wilensky et al., Gain Sharing: A Good Concept Getting A Bad Name?,
26(1) HEALTH AFF. w58, w58-w67 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/
26/1/w58.full.
36. Id. at w62.
37. Id.
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growth, then-current laws prohibited the financial relationships the
program necessarily entailed.38 The agency chose to halt expansion
beyond the demonstration stage until Congress changed those laws.39
This did not stop further experiments into the concept, however.
Since 1995, CMS has undertaken fifty-seven demonstration projects
to study different strategies of cost-containment,40 prompting some to
snipe that a “holy grail” that solves both the country’s quality and
cost problems is unattainable.41
ACOs are an outgrowth of those demonstration projects which
optimists seem to view as that very panacea.42 It is that goal and those
policies that define ACOs. Insofar as they are defined broadly as a
new payment philosophy and not the organizational structure and
policies attempting to implement that philosophy, the optimists may
have their panacea. Such an all-encompassing definition, however,
probably does a disservice to previous and concurrent reform efforts.
Many reforms since the 1973 HMO Act, and the ACA’s major cost
reforms—most fashionably, but not exclusively, ACOs—work to
shift the basic payment structure away from a fee-for-service
model.43 Defining ACOs as the philosophical shift away from the
fee-for-service model is thus simplistic and overgenerous. Nonethe-
less, these specific policies attempting to foster that philosophical
shift outline ACOs. ACOs themselves are merely the organizations
that have signed up.
B. A Policy Construct
ACOs as a policy are largely an accumulation of best practices
of those previous projects. The projects tested the effectiveness of
concepts including coordinated care, chronic disease management,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. List of demonstration projects and associated reports, available at http://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/
Medicare-Demonstrations.html.
41. Theodore Marmor & Jonathon Oberlander, From HMOs to ACOs: The
Quest for the Holy Grail in U.S. Health Policy, 27(9) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215
(2012).
42. See generally Donald M. Berwick, ACOs: Promise, not Panacea, 318(10)
JAMA 1038 (2012).
43. Timothy C. Gutwald, Bending the Health Care Cost Curve, 90-JUN
MICH. B. J. 20, 21 (2011).
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and consumer-focused healthcare.44 Not all demonstrations improved
quality of care; of those that did not all decreased costs.45 Nonethe-
less, these projects contributed to ACO policy and are expected to
continue to do so. As the first CMS initiative to employ a pay-for-
performance scheme for physicians, the Physician Group Practice
(PGP) Demonstration Project was the most conceptually similar pro-
ject to ACOs.46 Under this program ten large physician groups, rang-
ing in size from 232 to 1,291 affiliated physicians, were compensated
under traditional fee-for-service terms but were additionally incen-
tivized with “performance payments” based on quality measures and
cost savings over set benchmarks. Four of the ten were able to sustain
significant cost savings, while all “undoubtedly” improved access,
care, and quality.47
While the PGP Demonstration is ACOs’ most direct predeces-
sor, other demonstrations also contributed conceptually. Of the ongo-
ing demonstration projects, seven projects’ participants were disqual-
ified from participation as ACOs until their projects’ termination
because the projects were so similar as to involve duplicative pay-
ments.48 Further, demonstration projects continue to be part of CMS’
strategy for improvements. Through an Innovation Center established
under the ACA,49 CMS continues to run projects and incorporate suc-
cessful concepts into its national program.50
While these demonstration projects showed the cost saving phi-
losophies inherent to HMOs could be applied in different contexts,
the demonstration participants were often large integrated health sys-
tems or large multi-specialty practice groups.51 In short, much like
44. See List of demonstration projects and associated reports, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. See generally OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DEV., AND ORG., DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION
(2011).
47. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DEV., AND ORG., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT (2009).
48. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,831-4 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425.102); 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(4) (2013).
49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a
(2010).
50. 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,835-6 (2011) (comments and responses discussing the
Innovation Center).
51. PGP Demonstration Project, supra note 46.
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the original HMOs. Seven of the ten PGP participants, in fact, ran or
owned an associated HMO.52 Viewing size as a prerequisite limited
the concept’s scalability; the majority of providers in the United
States practice in a solo or small-group setting.53 Unlike large sys-
tems where a patient receives all (or most of) their care within the
system, solo and small-group physician practices provide only a frac-
tion of a patient’s total care.54 Individual physicians have too little
connection to, and too little control over, the other care their patients
receive to be held responsible for total costs.55 Thus, under the pro-
ject’s model, while an HMO or a large multi-specialty group could be
held responsible for a patient’s total cost, physicians in small prac-
tices could not be. This limitation prevented any findings from the
project from being applied on a large scale.
A Dartmouth researcher, Elliot Fisher, is credited with bridging
this gap.56 He suggested that the provision of healthcare is not as
fragmented as the number of individual and small-practice physicians
might suggest.57 Even when the delivery of patient care is not coordi-
nated through an integrated organization, it is most often focused
around a local hospital and the physicians practicing therein.58 From
this insight, he suggested the appropriate locus for cost accountability
was the “extended hospital medical staff.”59 As such a group of phy-
sicians, anchored (at least theoretically) around a local hospital, pro-
vided the majority of a patient’s care, that community of physicians
could be held accountable for a patient’s total cost. While critics
noted community accountability bucks the trend away from consoli-
dated care (a backlash from the managed care of the 1990s) and long
held notions of physician autonomy,60 Congress and CMS seized
upon the idea.
52. Id.
53. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Benefits of and Barriers to Large Medical
Group Practice in the United States, 163(16) ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1958
(2003).
54. Fisher, supra note 15 at w44.
55. Fisher, supra note 15.
56. Id. at w52-w53.
57. Id. at w45.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Amy M. Lischko et al., MASS. MED. SOC’Y, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
REFORM 31-2 (2008).
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Applying the idea to practice, ACOs hold primary care physi-
cians, as the representatives for that physician community, responsi-
ble for total patient costs.61 This broad accountability parallels the
HMO model, which holds a health plan or integrated health system
accountable for patients’ total cost. Thus, proponents contend, ACOs
achieve the integrative benefits of HMOs without all of their restric-
tions.62 The structural differences permitting this are 1) holding indi-
vidual physicians accountable for patient costs rather than a large
group or integrated health system, 2) contracting directly with provid-
ers instead of contracting through a health plan intermediary, and 3)
greater flexibility in allowing different types of organizations to par-
ticipate.63 While some of these structural differences limit the ways
ACOs may control costs, they also hold the potential for ACOs to
have a wider ranging impact than did HMOs.
C. An Expanded Impact
ACOs share HMOs’ emphasis on primary care, but increased
flexibility and geographic spread expand their possible reach and im-
pact, and any integrative benefits accompanying them. More thor-
oughly integrated health systems, like HMOs, are limited in their sys-
temic impact to the urban areas they predominantly serve. The HMO
model is ill-suited to smaller markets because of the integral part
economies of scale play in their cost savings.64 Correspondingly,
HMO penetration rates are negatively correlated with market size.65
They have little means (or motive) to change markets outside their
own. The greater flexibility of ACOs is the response. Participation in
the ACO program is not limited to large physician groups or those
with an institutional sponsor.66 While these flexibilities are designed
61. Assignment of Medicare Fee-for-service Beneficiaries to ACOs, 42
U.S.C. § 1395jjj(c) (2010).
62. Birnbaum, supra note 9 at 723.
63. Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations
Improve the Value of Health Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?
URBAN INST. 5 (2009).
64. Douglas Wholey et al., Scale and Scope Economies Among Health
Maintenance Organizations, 15(6) J. HEALTH ECON. 657 (1996).
65. Large Metropolitan Markets Have Highest HMO Penetration Rates
According to New Research from InterStudy Publications” PRNEWSWIRE, http://
insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?a=featured_pr&n=1&id=15242#.UTeT4jC0K
So (last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
66. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b) (2010);
Eligible providers and suppliers, 42 C.F.R § 425.102 (2012).
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to bring greater numbers into the integrative fold, an emphasis on
primary care may, in part, limit costs.
In addition to cost savings, other benefits are hoped to accom-
pany this emphasis. Primary care does appear to have a positive im-
pact on population health. This relationship appears to be indepen-
dent of increased healthcare supply generally.67 Though increased
total physician supply is associated with improved health outcomes,
increased supplies of primary care physicians show stronger correla-
tion.68 More directly, while some sociodemographic factors associ-
ated with increased primary care supply cloud results, evidence sug-
gests that primary care has a positive influence on several measures
of population health.69 Among the factors that contribute to these im-
proved outcomes is primary care’s increased focus on prevention,
early management of health problems, and reduction of unnecessary
specialty care.70 These qualitative factors logically suggest cost effi-
ciencies. In practice, the relationship between cost efficiencies and
either early management or preventative care is less certain.71 Despite
this uncertainty Congress, through the ACA, made clear their desire
for an increased role for primary care.72
CMS further emphasized the centrality of primary care physi-
cians in its ACO regulations. While the greater flexibility ACOs offer
allows any physician to form an ACO, Medicare beneficiaries are
assigned to an ACO based on the primary care services a primary
care provider (PCP) delivers.73 PCPs are defined as physicians with a
specialist designation of general practice, primary care, internal
medicine, or geriatric medicine.74 Given Dr. Fisher’s insight to hold a
community of physicians responsible for patient costs, the choice of
primary care physicians as the locus was perhaps the most obvious
67. Richard A. Cooper, States With More Physicians Have Better-Quality
Health Care, 28(1) HEALTH AFFAIRS w91 (2009).
68. Id.
69. Barbara Starfield et al., The Effects Of Specialist Supply On Populations’
Health: Assessing The Evidence, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2005). http://content.
healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/03/15/hlthaff.w5.97.full.pdftˇml.
70. Barbara Starfield et al., Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems
and Health, 83(3) MILBANK QUARTERLY 453, 474-83 (2005).
71. Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventative Care Save Money?, Health
Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 (2008).
72. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(c)
(2010).
73. Basic Assignment Methodology, 42 C.F.R. § 425.402 (2012).
74. Definitions, 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2012).
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option, but not the only one. While the statute specifies beneficiary
assignment to an ACO based on utilization of primary care services,75
the statute does not mandate who provide those services. Many com-
menters suggested specialists providing primary care services should
be eligible for beneficiary assignment.76 While CMS’s final rule
blends these two approaches, the statute’s intentional emphasis on
primary care is retained, and assignment is done first through the ser-
vices a PCP provides. While this does not prohibit a specialist from
providing primary care services, assignment based on those services
occurs only in the absence of a PCP.77 It is this emphasis on primary
care throughout the ACO regulations, and throughout the ACA, that
proponents contend will encourage preventative medicine and dis-
courage overutilization, ultimately limiting costs.78
HMOs’ awkward fit in small markets, and physician fears in all
markets, contributes to a limited spread and depth of integrative ben-
efits. Of the HMOs operating in rural areas, most are network HMOs
instead of fully integrated systems.79 As a diluted version of the fully
integrated HMO model, network HMOs’ integrative benefits appear
more limited. For example, HMO networks have limited impact on
referral patterns in rural areas because the lower number of available
physicians curtails HMOs’ ability to control the entire sphere of a
patient’s care.80 A primary care provider (PCP) may have little choice
but to refer to an out-of-network specialist with no participating spe-
cialists nearby. HMOs’ limited presence in smaller and rural markets
further limits any wider integrative effects they might exert.
ACOs, in contrast, are explicitly envisioned to extend to rural
markets. CMS changed ACO eligibility requirements to encourage
the “highly desired” participation of rural health clinics.81 Medicare’s
75. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(c)
(2010).
76. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,854-6 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425.102).
77. Id.
78. Peter Boland et al., Accountable Care Organizations Hold Promise, But
Will They Achieve Cost and Quality Targets?, MANAGED CARE 12, 13 (Oct. 2010),
available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1010/1010.ACOs.html.
79. Anthony Wellever, Implications of HMOs for Rural Providers and
Consumers, 14(3) J. RURAL HEALTH 268 (2008).
80. Id.
81. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,813 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R pt. 425.102).
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(and potentially ACOs’) much larger patient base amplifies any sys-
temic integrative benefits ACOs may generate. In communities inte-
grated systems already serve, ACOs may extend integrative incen-
tives to physicians wary of the HMO model. As some physicians
resist attempts to integrate fearing lost autonomy,82 ACOs may offer
a model that allows such practitioners to maintain their autonomy
while reaping some of the benefits of integration. To the extent ACOs
confer these benefits and alleviate physicians’ fears of lost autonomy,
they both extend the geographic reach and deepen the penetration of
integrative benefits.
Not everyone is convinced ACOs can limit costs or improve
quality of care. Some contend that medical “waste” cannot be elimi-
nated without accompanying reductions in quality.83 In creating in-
centives to eliminate such waste, ACOs may create incentives to re-
duce quality. Even proponents acknowledge that ACO growth will be
limited to the extent they are perceived as “HMOs in drag.”84 If con-
sumers associate ACOs with the lack of choice and rationing of care
popularly associated with HMOs, patients will be reluctant to see par-
ticipating physicians. These reservations illustrate both the challenges
ACOs face and the external forces that may limit the cost savings
they are able to achieve.
ACOs’ ability to achieve cost savings directly is also questioned.
These critics suggest the ever increasing costs of medical technology
alone will make the cost savings ACOs achieve fickle and ephem-
eral.85 Because preventative medicine’s cost efficiency is inconsis-
tent, this too may not be the source of savings proponents imagine.
Some studies even suggest preventative medicine increases costs.86 If
born out, while not necessarily fatal, such quality and cost concerns
urge increased regulatory oversight. These concerns emphasize the
importance of the continuous improvement (partially through demon-
stration projects) ACOs’ policy structure hopes to facilitate. The fac-
tors that may limit the cost savings ACOs are able to achieve only
heighten the need to fully exploit any benefits ACOs may offer.
82. See Casalino et al., supra note 53.
83. Mantel, supra note 6.
84. Devers & Berenson, supra note 63 at 5.
85. Mantel, supra note 6 at 1426.
86. Joshua Cohen et al., Does Preventative Medicine Save Money? Health
Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 661 (2008).
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Systemic Balance: From Patient to Provider
ACOs will not exactly replicate the successes HMOs enjoyed in
controlling costs. ACOs’ intentional differences from HMOs place
constraints on these savings. The rationing of care and lack of patient
choice closely associated with the HMO model did constrain costs,
but were omitted from the ACO model because their unpopularity
ultimately limited HMOs’ spread.87 HMOs used rationing and limita-
tions on choice as indirect constraints on systemic capacity.88 Single
entity HMOs could directly constrain capacity through their person-
nel and facility construction decisions. These capacity constraints
contributed to the model’s cost savings,89 but are absent from ACOs.
While such constraints perhaps lie outside the patient-centered focus
of the program, they are within the scope of the legislation. Ignoring
them unnecessarily limits ACOs’ cost saving potential.
Congress outlined its goals for ACOs via the ACA. The act au-
thorizes “the Secretary [to] establish a shared savings program . . .
that promotes accountability for a patient population and coordinates
items and services under [Medicare] parts A and B . . . , and encour-
ages investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for
high quality and efficient care delivery.”90 In formulating its ACO
regulations, CMS was careful to stay within this statutory authoriza-
tion. In doing so, CMS adopted a markedly patient and provider cen-
tered approach, to the exclusion of system structure. CMS detailed its
eight goals for ACOs in its first proposed rule, referencing them in its
final rule.91 Of these eight goals, seven focus on the internal opera-
tion of an ACO, most frequently in how those goals affect patients.
The only listed external goal refers to care transitions, targeting
smooth coordination for patients.92 Given CMS’s concerns that qual-
ity may be sacrificed to cost efficiencies,93 this focus on patients is
understandable. Further, the statute’s mention of quality places this
87. See generally Mechanic, supra note 21.
88. In contrast, most single-payer systems use direct restraints. Neelam K.
Sekhri, Managed Care: The US Experience, 78(6) BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
830, 837 (2000).
89. Id.
90. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (2010).
91. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,533-4 (proposed April 7, 2011) (to be codified at 425 C.F.R.
pt. 425).
92. Id.
93. Birnbaum, supra note 9 at 722.
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focus squarely within the bounds of the statute. However, the regula-
tions narrow the focus beyond the statute’s requisites. The HMO ex-
perience may have driven CMS concerns about quality, and CMS
may have written its regulations to avoid direct mention of integra-
tion to avoid inciting fears of loss of choice. Nonetheless, in narrow-
ing its focus, CMS neglects potential cost-saving, integrative
opportunities.
The regulations focus their reform efforts on individual behavior
rather than system structure. This focus stems from the value-based
purchasing concept that CMS hopes will replace the traditional fee-
for-service model.94 Value-based purchasing “links payment directly
to the quality of care provided,” and thus does not encourage volume
in the way the traditional model does.95 This reflects a view that indi-
vidual provider incentives are driving the overutilization of care.
Even physicians agree the fee-for-service model contributes to overu-
tilization.96 But other factors also certainly contribute.97 In focusing
exclusively on individual provider incentives, however, systemic fac-
tors driving higher costs are ignored. While encouraging change in
individual physician behavior via value-based purchasing is a direct
means to control costs, ACOs could also encourage broader systemic
change that influences patient decisions and community capacity
decisions.
A. Community Capacity Decisions
Community capacity encompasses all the medical facilities and
providers in a defined region, including physicians, hospitals, and an-
cillary facilities.98 Attempts to manage capacity as a cost control
mechanism have addressed physicians and facilities separately. Many
states passed certificate of need (CON) laws that imposed regulatory
controls on the construction of new medical facilities, including hos-
94. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,530 (proposed April 7, 2011) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt.
425).
95. Id.
96. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization,
299(23) JAMA 2789 (June 18, 2008).
97. Id.
98. This is the definition used in this paper and corresponds with Fishers’
concept. Fisher, supra note 15.
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pitals and ancillary facilities.99 The federal government followed suit
with the National Health Planning and Resources Act of 1974.100
These laws were enacted to counter a perceived oversupply of medi-
cal facilities, but were unpopular as they effectively imposed upper
limits on facility supply and entrenched established players.101 In
time, policymakers reversed course, deciding the laws were con-
straining facility supply with undue burdens, and thereby increasing
costs.102 The federal law was repealed, with many states following
suit.103 Nonetheless, many states continue to use CON laws as a
mechanism to control costs through facility capacity.104 Amid the
politics and subjective requirements of CON decisions, the efficacy
of these laws continues to be questioned.105
Physician capacity has also received policymakers’ attention.
This capacity refers to both the total number of physicians for a de-
fined population and the services those physicians provide.106 As
such, physician capacity reflects not only the number of physicians,
but the mix of primary care and specialist physicians.107 Competitive
entrance into medical schools, the subsidization of medical education,
and licensure requirements were all implemented to ensure the qual-
ity of physician care.108 However, state licensure requirements and
competitive medical school admissions erect barriers to entry into the
profession, and thus also influence the market dynamics of physician
supply. Government funding of medical education decreases barriers
99. Mark E. Kaplan, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Florida’s Hospital
“Certificate of Need” Program and Recommendations for Change, 19 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 475, 478 (1991).
100. National Health Planning and Resources Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (repealed 1986).
101. Lauretta Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The
Economic Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 261 (2001).
102. Id. at 269-72.
103. Id.
104. Lauretta Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The
Economic Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 261 (2001).
105. Tracy Yee et. al., Health Care Certificate-of-Need Laws: Policy or
Politics?, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE REFORM (MAY 2011), http://wwwnihr.org/
CON_Laws.html.
106. See Fisher, supra note 15 at w53.
107. Id.
108. Richard Cooper, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and
Medical Markets, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 925, 927 (2001).
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(for instance, subsidizing students’ debt), thus influencing total physi-
cian capacity, but also influences the composition of that capacity by
funding specialist training. Since their implementation, these quality
measures have been commandeered to influence the size and compo-
sition of physician supply, rather than its quality.109 While regulatory
action typically lags identified supply issues, policymakers continue
to make adjustments in response to capacity.110
Policies to influence physician location decisions have also been
popular. While the last twenty years has seen an increase in the total
number of physicians, large geographic capacity variations persist.111
Capacity management policies have influenced physicians’ deci-
sions,112 but location preferences remain the major determinant of ca-
pacity in a given region.113 Illustratively, programs to encourage phy-
sicians to locate in underserved areas are estimated to have a
significant, but small, effect (10%).114 This combination of prefer-
ences and policies results in large variations. Washington, DC has
over three times as many specialists per capita as Wichita, KS, but
less than twice as many primary care physicians.115 Physicians, like
other workers, make location decisions based on personal preferences
and market conditions. However, regulatory structures, especially
those involving financial incentives, can influence their choices.116
This demonstrates that policies encouraging balanced capacity and
market forces effect physician workforce composition. ACO policy,
109. Id. at 927.
110. David Blumenthal, New Steam from an Old Cauldron — The Physician-
Supply Debate, 350 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1780 (2004).
111. Id.
112. Denis Bolduc et al., The Effect of Incentive Policies on Practice
Location of Doctors: A Multinomial Probit Analysis, 14(4) J. LAB. ECON. 703
(1996).
113. David C. Goodman, Trends: Twenty-Year Trends In Regional Variations
In The U.S. Physician Workforce, HEALTH AFF. (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.
org/content/early/2004/10/07/hlthaff.var.90.full.pdf (lasted visited Mar. 7, 2013).
114. George M. Holmes, Increasing Physician Supply in Medically
Underserved Areas, 12(5) LAB. ECON. 697 (2005).
115. Washington, DC (HRR), DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTHCARE (2006),
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/profile.aspx?loc=344.; Wichita, KS
(HRR), DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTHCARE (2006), http://www.dartmouthatlas.
org/data/region/profile.aspx?loc=348.
116. Bruce E. Carpenter, An Analysis of the Location Decision of Young
Primary Care Physicians, 27(2) ATLANTIC ECON. J. 135 (1999); A.H. Krist et al.,
Title VII funding and physician practice in rural or low-income areas., 21(1) J.
RURAL HEALTH 3 (2005).
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therefore, will not only influence this workforce composition but may
be managed to influence it.
B. The Costs of Imbalance
Congress recognized the importance of primary care when es-
tablishing the shared savings program, and mandated primary care
utilization determine a beneficiary’s ACO assignment.117 This assign-
ment places accountability for patient cost squarely on PCPs. CMS’s
regulations emphasize primary care through their direct effect on the
provision of healthcare to beneficiaries, but do not encourage any
systemic effects they might induce. This narrowing was not necessary
to comply with the statute’s terms, and misses an important part of
the original ACO concept in failing to establish physician accounta-
bility for community capacity. Elliot Fisher’s original “extended
medical staff” model118 envisioned an institutional component to the
group accountable for patient cost. “The most important reason to
focus on hospitals and their medical staffs is to establish accountabil-
ity for decisions about capacity.”119 That institutional component of a
group of physicians, subsequently termed ACOs, would enable an
influence on those community capacity decisions that have an impact
on cost. Such capacity decisions impact cost through their effects on
supply sensitive services.
Demand for such services increases as their supply increases. In
Fisher’s original conception, supply sensitive services included office
“visits, specialist consultations, tests, imaging services, and the use of
institutional settings (rather than outpatient settings) for care.”120 Em-
pirical studies suggest this relationship holds true. There are over
double the number of magnetic resonance imaging machines per cap-
ita in the United States performing nearly double the number of ex-
ams compared to the OECD average.121 Living in an area with in-
creased hospital capacity is associated with higher rates of hospital
utilization, even after controlling for demographic and health differ-
117. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(c) (2010).
118. Fisher, supra note 15.
119. Id. at w52-3.
120. Id.
121. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Health at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators, 85 (Jan. 11, 2013) OCED.ORG available
at http://www.oecd.org /health-systems/health-at-a-glance.htm.
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ences.122 Neither is associated with improved health outcomes. Fur-
ther examples exist: chronically-ill patients are more likely to receive
care in the inpatient setting; the supply of hospital beds influences
physicians’ discharge and admission decisions.123 These studies over-
whelming point towards excess facility capacity driving demand.
However, excess capacity driving demand extends beyond facilities.
Physician services also exhibit supply-sensitive demand. Com-
position and supply of physicians correlates strongly with their utili-
zation.124 American patients receive significantly more cardiac revas-
cularization procedures—almost twice as many as the next highest
country—than other OECD members.125 Capacity may even influ-
ence individual patient decisions. A patient with chest pain may be
more likely to forgo scheduling an appointment with a PCP in favor
of an appointment with a cardiologist if the cardiologist has sufficient
time to schedule the patient quickly. Likewise, an underemployed
specialist is likelier to schedule more frequent check-ups than medi-
cally necessary. Forty-one percent of the variation in spending across
regions is statistically attributable to differences in community capac-
ity.126 This increase in spending does not appear to improve out-
comes, as increased specialist supply does not correlate with in-
creased population outcomes.127
This data suggests gross imbalances in community capacity are
significantly increasing costs. It was this problem that ACOs were
originally envisioned, at least in part, to address. The institutional
component (hospitals or multi-specialty practice groups) of an ACO
envisioned to facilitate rebalancing, however, was rejected as overly
restrictive and an unnecessary limitation on the scope of the pro-
gram.128 Managed care uses rationing and limitations on choice to
122. Elliot S. Fisher, et al., Associations Among Hospital Capacity,
Utilization, and Mortality of U.S. Medicare Beneficiaries, Controlling for
Sociodemographic Factors, 34(6) HEALTH SERVS.RESEARCH 1351, 1351 (2000).
123. Elliot S. Fisher, et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in
Medicare Spending, Part 1: The Content, Quality and Accessibility of Care, 138(4)
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 273, 273 (2003).
124. Id. at 286.
125. OECD, supra note 121at 28-29.
126. John Wennberg, Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform,
21(2) HEALTH AFF. (2002): w96-w114. Web Exclusive, available at http://www.
dartmouth.edu/~jskinner/documents/WennbergGeographyandtheDebate.pdf.
127. Starfield supra note 69 at w5-105.
128. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,813 (Nov. 2, 2011).
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serve as capacity constraints, while traditional HMOs have controlled
capacity more directly. ACOs, on the other hand, lack a clear entity
to make those capacity decisions and serve as a constraint on capac-
ity-driven costs.
C. The Missing Integration
HMOs’ integrated finances create an intrinsic organizational in-
centive to efficiently balance capacity. Integrative benefits can extend
much further, though they differ among horizontal, vertical, and func-
tional integrations. Despite the sound economic underpinnings of
these benefits, misunderstanding these variants has created unrealistic
expectations from, and is a source of continued disenchantment with,
integration.129 For instance, vertical integration may facilitate quality
improvements, but does little to alter market power. Thus, providers
vertically integrating with expectations of increased bargaining
power may be disappointed, and even neglect potential quality bene-
fits.130 In this light, prudent recognition and encouragement of poten-
tial benefits can help ensure those benefits’ realization.
Functional integrations, either horizontal or vertical, merge the
operations of entities without complete, formal integration. While
also yielding varied benefits, functional integrations’ narrower scope
make them less prone to misguided expectations. Examples include
clinical and financial integration. Proponents contend clinical integra-
tion (often broadly characterized under the coordinated care um-
brella) yields quality improvements with lessened anticompetitive by-
products vis-a`-vis full integration.131 With this narrow scope (and
purpose), few providers would expect increased market power from
participation in such a merger. Similarly, integrated finances might
incentivize efficient capacity decisions and create economies of scale,
but expectations of care quality improvements would be minimal.
The widely touted ACO does not have the benefit of such modest
129. Lawton Burns & Mark Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour
On the Road to Integrated Health Care?, 21(4) HEALTH AFF. 128, 128-30 (2002).
130. Generally, economic theory does not purport that vertical integration
increases market power. However, in the healthcare context, integrated delivery
systems may be able to offer integrated products to payers that fragmented
providers could not, and thus wield greater market power.
131. Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care
Organizations to Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1449
(2012) (arguing integrated clinical care can thwart anti-trust challenges to New
Jersey Medicaid ACOs).
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expectations.132 Nonetheless, an entity that enables the benefits of
these various forms of integration will be necessary to achieve
CMS’s three-part aim.133 ACOs hope to fill this role.
Neither horizontal nor vertical integrative benefits alone can
hope to fulfill CMS’s three-part aim. Horizontal integration, the
merging of providers offering the same or similar services, allows
economies of scale and increased market power, but may have only
indirect effects on care coordination. For example, the merger of sev-
eral solo practitioners into a single entity may result in efficiency
gains when they are then able to share administrative personnel or
overhead expenses, but have little effect on patient care. Importantly
for ACOs, horizontal integration of the smallest groups creates larger
patient datasets, enabling the population view of health the three-part
aim requires.134
While the ACO regulations encourage some horizontal integra-
tion with threshold size requirements to ensure that population
view,135 the benefits ACOs hope to achieve most resemble those from
vertical integration.136 Gains flow from vertical integration when im-
proved coordination overcomes the costs of decreased organizational
specialization.137 In economic parlance, gains from improved coordi-
nation decrease transaction and monitoring costs.138 In the common
parlance of ACOs, these decreases in transaction costs translate into
care coordination: better communication amongst a patient’s provid-
ers resulting in more harmonized care. This combination of horizon-
tal and vertical benefits—increased care coordination and fostering a
population view of health—are the integrative benefits CMS touts.
132. Marmor, supra note 41 at 1216.
133. Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27(3)
HEALTH AFF. 759, 763 (2008).
134. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,808 (2011).
135. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (b)(2)(D)
(2010).
136. Vertical integration in the healthcare context often refers to the
integration of financing (e.g. insurers) and healthcare providers. In this context,
however, vertical integration is used in the economic sense to mean integrations
between different members of the value chain. Vertical integrations in this sense
would include integrations between physicians and hospitals, or physicians offering
different services.
137. Burns, supra note 129 at 129.
138. Id. 
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Financial accountability, in the form of shared savings, is the mecha-
nism to incentivize these benefits.
1. The Institutional Component
The major advantage HMOs possessed, and ACOs hope to pos-
sess, is the cost accountability integrated systems enable. Integration
of payor, provider, and institutional components fostered this ac-
countability in the HMO model. Central to CMS’s three-part aim is a
similar “integrator” able to accept accountability for each of these
three components.139 Kaiser Permanente, often regarded as a model
HMO, is touted as an example of such an integrator.140 The “value-
based purchasing” concept ACOs embody is meant to fill the payor
component of integration.141 As a provider organization, ACOs inher-
ently fill the provider role. Missing is the institutional component.
As originally explained in both Fisher’s “extended medical
staff” and CMS administrator Berwick’s “triple aim,” such an inte-
grator contained this institutional component.142 This assumed some
level of integration. The institutional component would enable capac-
ity decisions encompassing the entire continuum of care patients in a
community receive. CMS, however, has soundly “reject[ed] the pro-
position that an entity that is under single control. . . would be more
likely to achieve the three-part aim [of better care, better health, and
lower costs],” in favor of more inclusive flexibility and the accompa-
nying potential for expanded participation.143 Further, CMS worried
that an institutional component would encourage attempts to restrict
provider networks, hindering patients’ choice.144 Without a required
139. Berwick, supra note 133 at 763.
140. Id.
141. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,803-4 (April 7, 2011) (“We view value-based purchasing as
an important step to revamping how care and services are paid for, moving
increasingly toward rewarding better value, outcomes, and innovations instead of
merely increased volume.”).
142. Berwick, supra note 133 at 763.(That role might be. . . a powerful,
visionary insurer; a large primary care group in partnership with payors; or even a
hospital, with some affiliated physician group, that seeks to be especially attractive
to payors.”); Fisher, supra note 15 at w45 (“fostering the development of
accountable care organizations comprising local hospitals and the physicians who
work within and around them”).
143. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,843 (Nov. 2, 2011).
144. Id. at 67,808.
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institutional component, however, ACOs lack HMOs’ inherent ca-
pacity balancing incentive.
Those ACOs with an institutional component have an engrained
interest in maintaining their existing capacity. As such, a hospital-
sponsored ACO would be unlikely to rebalance capacity in favor of
competing, but more efficient, institutions. Competitive pressures
dictate full utilization of the ACO institution’s existing capacity, and
consequently incentivize a balance between community needs and
that existing capacity, but not the capacity of the entire system. A
hospital-sponsored ACO in a market with competitors is incentivized
to fully utilize its existing facilities, with community needs only set-
ting an upper limit on capacity. Further, in attempting to maximize
utilization, those institutions have a direct economic interest in en-
couraging use of supply-sensitive services. While ACOs without an
institutional component lack direct control over capacity decisions,
they also lack this profit incentive to utilize existing capacity.
Fisher’s conception recognizes the problem of competing capacity,
but concludes physician services are sufficiently concentrated in
many communities to make ACOs feasible.145 Likewise, the integra-
tor Berwick imagines cares for a defined population with a specified
payor, and thus contains an inherent institutional component.146 This
component’s absence dilutes the capacity balancing effects ACOs
might make possible in communities with multiple provider groups.
2. The Personnel Component
For Fisher, the more important implications of his study were
not the institutional component of practice patterns, but the concen-
tration of care.147 As “physicians adapt their practices to work with
whatever resources are available,” the observed concentration of care
supports a causal link between supply of specialist services and their
demand.148 In placing financial accountability on referring physi-
145. Fisher, supra note 15 at w46.
146. Berwick, supra note 133.
147. Fisher, supra note 15 at w48; see also id. at w46 (Fisher’s empirical
results showed 62% of doctors performing inpatient services, of which 90% were
performed at a single hospital. This served as the institutional component of his
“extended medical staff.” That “extended medical staff” accounted for 73% of the
care patients of those doctors received, implying concentration of care.).
148. Id. at w53. See also David Goodman, Preventing Ruin, or the Ruin of
United States Health Care? 32 J. LEGAL MED. 61, 71 (2011).
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cians, with greater emphasis on a PCP being that referring physi-
cian,149 the concept hoped to encourage less specialist-intensive prac-
tice patterns, and thus controls costs. Outside physician groups which
only refer internally (large multispecialty practice groups or HMOs),
however, changed practice patterns have no direct effect on the per-
sonnel component of capacity.
The ACA and ACOs seek to influence personnel capacity
through other means. Changing practice patterns have indirect effects
on such capacity. As a source of referrals dries up and specialists’
income decreases, the desirability of practicing in a given specialty
should diminish. Market dynamics would diminish supply of those
specialists in parallel. Bolstering this market dynamic, ACO efforts to
coordinate care150 between PCPs and specialists may reduce duplica-
tive care and thereby decrease demand for specialist services. Fur-
ther, specialists aligned with an ACO may increase their productivity
(and income) if they receive higher margin referrals from the ACO,
rather than filling their schedule with follow-ups and lower margin
services. Thus, ACOs may decrease unwarranted demand for special-
ists generally while increasing the productivity of aligned specialists.
This should make alignment attractive for specialists, and thus com-
petition among specialists for alignment should reinforce other mar-
ket forces limiting supply. These dynamics should complement other
components of the ACA which encourage adjustments to the compo-
sition and geographic distribution of physician supply.
The ACA seeks to adjust composition through an increase of
both primary care providers and specialists in shortage.151 Despite
research indicating specialists may generate their own demand,152 the
ACA does nothing to discourage practice in overrepresented special-
ties. Similarly, the ACA encourages an increase in supply of provid-
ers in rural and underserved areas, but does little to discourage prac-
tice in overrepresented areas.153 Fisher’s conception introduced a
mechanism through which systemic capacity balance, both its institu-
149. Diane Rittenhouse, Stephen Shortell, & Elliot Fisher, Primary Care and
Accountable Care—Two Essential Elements of Delivery System Reform, 361(24)
N. ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301 (2009).
150. Required Processes and Patient-centeredness Criteria, 42 C.F.R.
§ 425.112 (2012).
151. Elayne J. Heisler, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 11-18 R42029, at 15-17 (Jan. 15, 2013).
152. See infra part IIB.
153. Heisler, supra note 151 at 18-23.
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tional and personnel components, might be encouraged with market
forces. However, neither Fisher nor Berwick counter the institutional
incentives to maintain existing capacity. Both rely on market forces
to balance personnel capacity. In moving from conception to imple-
mentation, ACOs have expanded beyond their original capabilities.
While the original conception envisioned some element of integration
between providers and institutions, no such integration is now re-
quired of ACOs. Without required integration, the benefits of inte-
grated care, including the care coordination at the center of ACOs’
quality benefits and systemic balance, must come from elsewhere.
ACOs are an experiment in achieving integrative benefits
outside a completely integrated environment. HMOs represent one
end of the integrative spectrum. Multispecialty practice groups—less
integrated than an HMO, but still containing many elements of inte-
gration—were a logical place to attempt to apply these integrative
benefits outside the fully integrated context. A large number of mul-
tispecialty practice groups, especially those with HMO experience,
were among the PGP demonstration participants.154 These groups
have an inherent incentive to balance the personnel component of
capacity. Similarly, physician groups associated with a hospital (or
insurance company, though examples are rare) have an inherent in-
centive to balance the institutional component of capacity. Before the
final rule was published, several commenters even erroneously as-
sumed ACO groups would have a required hospital association.155
CMS explicitly concluded such a requirement would preclude flexi-
bility, and was thus undesirable.156
While this flexibility is ACOs’ ultimate attraction, several fea-
tures of ACOs frustrate the capacity realignment inherent to the inte-
grated model.157 In fact, some of the definitional features that distin-
guish ACOs from HMOs work against such realignment. CMS
distinguishes HMOs from ACOs because ACOs place “the patient at
the center.”158 Retention of both the fee-for-service (FFS) payment
model and patient choice are two of the major contributors to this
154. PGP Demonstration Project, supra note 47.
155. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,814 (Nov. 2, 2011).
156. Id.
157. Rittenhouse, supra note 149 at 2302-3.
158. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,805 (Nov. 2, 2011).
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patient-centeredness. FFS payments, in contrast to the capitated pay-
ments of HMOs, limit the financial incentive to restrict a patients’
care, and are maintained under ACOs.159 ACOs do not limit patient
choice, as Berwick emphasized, because a provider network is not
defined: patients are free to select and switch providers.160 While le-
gitimate policy choices, these ACO features work against capacity
realignment. The combination of FFS and the free choice of patients
allows a patient to circumvent their PCP and seek specialist care or
ancillary services independently. These are among the supply sensi-
tive services Fisher identified as contributing to unnecessary costs.161
Further, those specialist and ancillary service providers (institutions)
are not necessarily part of the ACO structure, and thus do not neces-
sarily share its incentives.162
With ACOs’ and the ACA’s emphasis on primary care, PCPs
will be an integral part of any capacity adjustments that ACOs en-
courage. The organizational flexibility integral to CMS’s vision for
ACO expansion suggests only PCPs will be a common feature of all
ACOs. Of the current (through January 31, 2013) ACOs, physician
groups sponsor fifty-six percent, though these ACOs often cover sig-
nificantly fewer lives than the thirty-six percent of ACOs hospitals
sponsor.163 These groups have either an engrained mechanism to bal-
ance personnel capacity (in the case of multispecialty groups) or no
personal financial interest in personnel capacity (in the case of PCP
groups). Combined with CMS’s emphasis on PCPs, these physician
group-sponsored ACOs could be well positioned to make responsible
community capacity decisions, and thus encourage the systemic bal-
ance that contributed to HMOs’ success in cost control.
159. Id.
160. Bimbaum, supra note 9 at 722.
161. Fisher, supra note 15 at w53.
162. Lawton Burns & Mark Pauly, Accountable Care Organizations May
Have Difficulty Avoiding the Failures of Integrated Delivery Networks of the
1990s, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2407, 2413 (2012).
163. David Muhlestein, Continued Growth of Public and Private Accountable
Care Organizations, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/19/continued-growth-of-public-and-private-
accountable-care-organizations/.
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III. Accountability: From Individual to Integrated
Despite their positioning, ACOs are encouraged to do little to
foster systemic balance. The ACO regulations encourage such sys-
temic change only indirectly. Small groups are required to organize
into larger groups and may consequently add horizontal integrative
benefits, though the requirement is geared towards statistically signif-
icant results, not any integrative benefits.164
The focus of behavior change is individual practice decisions.
CMS’s only attempt to influence “systematic” change was the intro-
duction of a two-sided risk model.165 This model would have forced
ACOs to eventually share the downside risk of any potential shared
saving, transferring risk from CMS to providers. Forcing providers to
share the financial risks of ineffective care with payors and patients
would have created organic incentives for cost efficiency. Predict-
ably, physicians were not pleased.166 CMS abandoned this option in
favor of a one-sided model to encourage broader participation.167
Even this notion of “systematic” change did not parallel Fisher’s
ideal in changing systemic incentives, but instead focused on provid-
ers’ and suppliers’ behavior.168
In their current form, the regulations seek to change the practice
patterns the FFS model encouraged without focusing on the system
that reinforces those patterns. Patient decisions, and the ways in
which physicians may influence them, intentionally receive little at-
tention. CMS “vigilantly” aims to retain the same level of patient
freedom of choice as the traditional (FFS) Medicare program.169 The
regulations are left fostering systemic balance only incidentally and
indirectly. Despite this, the regulations give ACOs an operational and
structural mechanism that positions them to make community capac-
ity decisions, were they empowered or encouraged to do so.
164. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,808.
165. Id. at 67,907.
166. Id.
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 67,908.
169. Id. at 67,804.
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A. Structural Potential to Capacity Balance
The structural components the regulations give ACOs facilitate
some integrative benefits contributing to systemic balance, but do lit-
tle to encourage capacity balance directly. Nonetheless, their struc-
ture does give CMS continuing power to influence decisions. ACOs
must satisfy quality measures to be eligible to receive shared savings.
These quality measures offer the most direct vehicle to influence
ACO behavior. Further, the regulations governing eligible partici-
pants and the assignment of beneficiaries to ACOs emphasize pri-
mary care. This emphasis exerts indirect pressures on personnel com-
position and institutional capacity.
The selection of entities eligible to form ACOs and the assign-
ment of beneficiaries to those ACOs emphasizes primary care over
other physician services. The ACA specified four groups (subject to
expansion by the Secretary) that would be eligible to form ACOs:
group practices, networks of individual practices, collaborations be-
tween hospitals and ACO professionals,170 and hospitals employing
ACO professionals.171 While CMS recognized this restriction would
prohibit some (perhaps desirable) entities from forming an ACO, it
found any expansion of eligible entities unnecessary.172 Because the
ACA mandates ACO beneficiary assignment based on utilization of
primary care services, specialist ACOs could be ACOs without any
assigned beneficiaries (and thus without the possibility of shared sav-
ings).173 In denying eligibility and thus limiting participation, CMS’s
refusal to bow to specialists’ interests demonstrated their focus on
primary care.
However, it is the assignment of beneficiaries, not eligibility of
entities, which is the principal mechanism stressing primary care.
Beneficiaries are assigned to an ACO based on the primary care ser-
vices provided. If a patient receives a plurality of such services from
a participating PCP, the patient is assigned to that PCP’s ACO.174 If
primary care was not received from a PCP, a beneficiary may be
170. The statute defines “ACO professionals” as including physicians and a
variety of mid-level providers. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395jjj (2010).
171. Id. at § 1395jjj(b)(1)(D).
172. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,812.
173. Id.
174. Basic Assignment Methodology, 42 C.F.R. § 425.402 (2012).
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assigned based on primary care services rendered by a participating
specialist.175 This assignment methodology forces accountability first
to a PCP, emphasizing the coordinating role of primary care. Despite
numerous comments suggesting otherwise, CMS narrowly defined
PCPs to both incentivize and emphasize this role.176 The narrow defi-
nition channels CMS resources through PCPs before dispersing them
to any other providers. The final rule is CMS’s effort to balance the
two extremes, allowing ACO beneficiary assignment to a specialist,
but only if no other ACO PCP provides more primary care services177
while not expanding the definition of primary care.
Quality measures must be met before an ACO is eligible to re-
ceive shared savings.178 These measures are among CMS’s most di-
rect instruments to dictate ACO behavior. Congress sought to ensure
ACOs did not reignite patients’ fears of HMOs: the loss of choice and
rationing of care. To do so, it granted the Secretary the power to
create these measures.179 Because failure to comply with these mea-
sures cancels any financial gain to ACOs, quality measures are obvi-
ous vehicles to demand activity facilitating capacity rebalance.
However, both the measures’ purposes and their implementation
might make this more difficult. First, balancing personnel and facility
capacity would inevitably involve the constriction of supply of some
areas: specialists, facilities or both. While empirical evidence sug-
gests that such a restriction would not necessarily reduce the quality
of care patients receive,180 a similar argument was made for HMO’s
unpopular rationing of care.181 This is exactly the result the quality
measures exist to prevent. As the statute specifies these measures are
to “evaluate the quality of care furnished by the ACO[,]”182 capacity-
focused quality measures might also exceed the Secretary’s rulemak-
ing authority. Second, providers might be reluctant to accept new
quality measures. In the proposed rule, CMS had sixty-six quality
measures. After considerable protest from commenters who thought
the number of metrics increased reporting burdens and diluted the
175. Id.
176. Definitions, 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2012).
177. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,892-6.
178. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d) (2010).
179. Marmor, supra note 41, at 1216.
180. Fisher, supra note 15; Emanuel, supra note 96.
181. Mechanic, supra note 21.
182. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (b)(2)(3)(B).
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measures’ effectiveness, the number was reduced to thirty-three.183
Despite their likely efficacy, these considerations constrain any addi-
tional measures CMS might impose to few in number and strictly
within their statutory authorization.
While the purpose of the Shared Savings statute constrains the
options to promote more balanced capacity, several possibilities ex-
ist; the quality measures making ACOs eligible to receive shared sav-
ings remain the most obvious means to control ACOs’ actions. PCP
providers need to be encouraged to identify effective and cost-effi-
cient specialists and ancillary facilities in their community. Patients
who otherwise have no preference could then be referred to those
providers and facilities without constraining patient choice. This
would exert additional pressure on excess supply within the system.
Additional quality measures might encourage efficiency as an addi-
tional factor in referral decisions, though to stay within the statutory
authorization promoting quality and systemic balance simultaneously
would be a prerequisite. Any measures designed exclusively to pro-
mote capacity balance would fall outside the Secretary’s authoriza-
tion. Similarly, ACOs could be encouraged to recruit those specialists
and facilities to their organization and thereby introduce them di-
rectly to the integrated incentive structure. While specialist-PCP rela-
tionships could be thus encouraged, ACOs should be discouraged
from creating exclusive relationships with large institutional provid-
ers. In doing so, CMS would be preventing ACOs from enabling such
providers to maintain existing capacity in disregard of community
capacity needs.
A. Operational Structure and Possibilities
Some operational characteristics mandated in the ACO regula-
tions may facilitate capacity rebalancing, even if they do not en-
courage it. Care coordination, continuous improvement, and the re-
quired governance structure either indirectly foster or position ACOs
to make these decisions. Both the regulation’s care coordination mea-
sures and its mandated governance structure accomplish this, in part,
through their emphasis on primary care. Further, both emphasize a
population view of patient care absent from traditional medicine but
necessary for conscientious community capacity decisions. The regu-
183. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations,76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,871 (2011).
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lations aim to encourage continuous improvement, in step with the
gradual nature of any capacity rebalance.
As one of the defining benefits of integrated healthcare, coordi-
nated care did not escape policymakers’ attention. The care coordina-
tion regulations are the only direct attempt to encourage integrative
benefit. This is done indirectly through their emphasis on patient
centeredness, and directly by fiat. As part of its application materials,
ACOs must submit defined “methods and processes . . . to coordinate
care” and identify target patients that would benefit from individual-
ized care programs.184 While the efficacy of these (essentially) report-
ing requirements in improving quality or decreasing costs is still un-
clear, any effects on capacity will be indirect. Theoretically, reducing
duplicative care should decrease demand for some capacity and thus
place downward pressure on its supply. Because demand for supply-
sensitive services often expands to meet capacity, however, generated
demand elsewhere in the community might counterbalance any
downward pressure on capacity supply these measures exert. The or-
ganic balance HMOs achieved through aligned financial incentives is
absent. While mandated assessments185 will help institutionalize these
gradual improvements, thus reinforcing any capacity adjustments,
any capacity effects seem likely to be incidental. The care coordina-
tion regulations give ACOs the vantage point to view any capacity
imbalances, yet encourage only a passive role in rebalancing. Despite
this passive role, the regulations add a governance structure further
positioning them to make capacity decisions.
ACOs’ mandated board structure ensures a community and pri-
mary care perspective beneficial to such community capacity deci-
sions. ACOs must have a governing board composed of both Medi-
care beneficiaries and ACO participants (providers and suppliers).186
Because a governing board has not been part of the stereotypical
small practice, any broader view of the organization and community
needs may already facilitate rebalance. The regulations skew the per-
spective of the board in mandating seventy-five percent be composed
of ACO participants, likely PCPs, and contain at least one Medicare
beneficiary without a financial interest in the ACO.187 While the ben-
184. Required Processes and Patient-Centeredness Criteria, 42 C.F.R.
§ 425.112(b)(3) & (4)(1) (2012).
185. 42 C.F.R. § 425.112(a)(3)(ii).
186. Shared Governance, 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(2) (2012).
187. 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(8) (2012).
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eficiary representative is included in the governance structure to en-
sure “focus on the beneficiary in all facets of ACO governance[,]”188
(patient-centeredness) the representative’s inclusion may also add the
community perspective to make appropriate capacity decisions. The
seventy-five percent composition requirement is designed to ensure
the organization is “provider driven.”189 Being “provider driven” has
the dual advantages of encouraging a primary care focus and limiting
outsized institutional influences. Thus, institutional providers with
existing capacity are limited in the influence they exert over capacity
decisions. CMS’s explicit rationale for this board is to ensure “strate-
gic direction” and alignment with the three-part aim.190 Like other
facets of ACOs, the “patient centeredness” the regulations encourage
qualifies this board to make capacity decisions. In its broadest inter-
pretation, the three-part aim includes rebalancing and is thus already
in the boards’ purview. However, consideration of such an abstract
goal only implicitly within their purview may be unlikely without
more explicit guidance.
Whether in the current regulatory structure or a modified one,
any capacity rebalancing coordinated care, market dynamics, or im-
proved governance enables is unlikely to occur or stabilize immedi-
ately. The current system reinforcing volume and intensity evolved as
stakeholders’ incentives diverged over many years.191 Reversing this
trend will not occur overnight. While the ACO program terminates
on December 31, 2015,192 even changes that have taken place by then
are unlikely to be institutionalized. CMS will almost certainly extend
the program if the results proponents predict occur. Drawing from its
experience in earlier demonstration projects, CMS’s mean estimate is
more modest at $470 million in net savings to Medicare over the
three-year lifespan of the program.193 This represents only a small
fraction of estimated Medicare spending over that same three years
($1.54 trillion),194 though CMS predicts both savings to the Medicare
188. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,821.
189. Id. at 67,820.
190. Id. at 67,817.
191. See generally Starr, supra note 7.
192. Agreement with CMS, 42 C.F.R. § 425.200(b) (2012).
193. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,973.
194. Medicare 2013 Baseline, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Feb 5, 2013), http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43894_Medicare2.pdf.
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program and net payments to providers. With providers’ investments
to participate in the program, CMS predicts providers will realize a
2.9 benefit-cost ratio.195 Even if results prove more modest than these
estimates, however, CMS and providers should commit to the pro-
gram beyond this three-year window. Savings as capacity realigns
and waste from supply-sensitive services deceases may not be imme-
diately apparent. Along with these capacity adjustments, the most
lasting impacts on the healthcare system will not occur until the phil-
osophical shift away from FFS extends beyond the Medicare ACO
program. Encouraging commercialization will extend this spread.
Despite ACOs limited effects on capacity, their potential to ef-
fect change on the payment structure of American healthcare remains
large. Including commercial variants, ACOs are expanding more rap-
idly and touching more lives than expected. Even before the January
2013 announcement of 106 new ACOs (bringing the total number of
ACOs to more than 250),196 upward estimates predicted ACOs were
reaching thirty-one million lives.197 ACOs’ potential for widespread
impact is apparent. If ACOs continue to spread to the commercial
payor sector, their effect will include not only Medicare’s payment
structure, but that of the entire healthcare system. This increasing
success and extended impact only increases their attractiveness as a
vehicle to balance capacity.
Summary
Despite policymakers’ careful distinctions, as a newer vehicle to
deliver integrated healthcare, ACOs are an ideological successor of
HMOs. Echoing a consumerist approach, ACOs attempt to do so by
keeping patients central to decisions. In applying this focus too nar-
rowly, however, ACOs are missing some of the critical elements of
cost control HMOs possessed. With supply driven demand account-
ing for a significant portion of wasted healthcare spending, balancing
195. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,973.
196. More Doctors, Hospitals Partner to Coordinate Care for Medicare, U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (January 10, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2013pres/01/20130110a.html.
197. Id. CMS estimates ACOs cover a more modest four million lives. See
Gabriel Perna, Surprise Surprise: ACOs are Touching More Patients than
Expected, www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/surprise-surprise-acos-are-
touching-more-patients-expected (Dec. 5, 2012).
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the capacity of healthcare resources is one of these critical elements.
While ACOs’ current regulatory structure encourages appropriate ca-
pacity only indirectly, that structure positions them to make conscien-
tious community capacity decisions. ACO boards should be en-
couraged to make such capacity decisions through their relationships
with other providers and additional quality measures. Capacity con-
siderations should inform ACO policy as it continues to evolve. The
systemic changes likely to impact cost, however, are unlikely to be
realized during the program’s short lifespan. As such, the ACO pro-
gram will have to be extended to have any effect on capacity.
